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Consumers have access to an ever-increasing inventory of 
video content choices as a result of technological innovations, 
more readily available broadband, new business plans, 
inexpensive high capacity storage and the Internet’s ability to 
serve as a single medium for a variety of previously standalone 
services delivered via different channels.  They increasingly have 
little tolerance for “appointment television” that limits access to a 
particular time, channel and device.  Access to video content is 
becoming a matter of using one of several software-configured 
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interfaces capable of delivering live and recorded content anytime, 
anywhere, to any device and via many different transmission and 
presentation formats. 
Technological and marketplace convergences eliminate the 
viability of judicial and regulatory models that apply varying 
degrees of First Amendment protection as a function of the medium 
delivering the content.  With the Internet serving as a single 
conduit for a variety of information, communications and 
entertainment, ventures can offer a bundle of services that span 
two or more regulatory classifications, for example, the ability of 
wireless handsets to make telephone calls, to receive video 
programming and to access the Internet. 
This Article will examine the ongoing migration from channels 
to software-configured platforms for accessing video content with 
an eye toward assessing the impact on consumers and the First 
Amendment.  The Article identifies the need for significant 
amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to provide a light-
handed and limited, but explicit statutory basis for the Federal 
Communications Commission to resolve predictable disputes 
between stakeholders and to remedy anticompetitive practices. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ways to distribute video content to consumers have begun 
to diversify, as the Internet becomes an increasingly attractive 
option for delivering programming, and provides an alternative to 
broadcast, satellite and cable networks.  Viewers no longer need to 
tolerate “appointment television,”1
                                                                                                             
1 See John Clancy, Why the Future of TV Is All About Personalization, MASHABLE 
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-mobile-personalization (“Consumers 
are changing their viewing habits in favor of ‘TV Everywhere.’ They no longer make 
‘appointments’ to sit down and view content, and are no longer limited by TV 
programming schedules. They want content whenever and wherever they are.”). 
 with access to content at a 
prescribed time, available on a single channel and delivered to a 
single receiving device using only one acceptable transmission 
format.  Access primarily will become a matter of using one of 
several software-configured interfaces capable of decoding live 
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and recorded content anytime, anywhere, to any device, and 
through many different transmission and presentation formats.2
Diversifying business models for delivering video content 
assumes that consumers can and will use multiple platforms to 
augment or replace traditional media.
 
3  Such diversification also 
challenges existing legal and regulatory models that support 
different degrees of government oversight and content regulation 
based on assumptions about a specific medium.  For radio and 
television broadcasters, the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) has imposed significant regulatory burdens based on 
assumptions that spectrum scarcity and the pervasiveness of the 
medium warrant mandatory and probably unprofitable public 
service obligations.4  Even prior to receiving explicit statutory 
authority, the FCC regulated cable television operators,5
                                                                                                             
2 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8613 (2012) (“Online 
video, like the Internet itself, has migrated beyond the computer to a wide variety of 
devices since the last report.  Consumers now can access [online video distributors’ 
(“OVD”)] service via computers, smartphones, tablets, gaming consoles, smart television 
sets, Blu-ray players, and a host of consumer electronics products.”). 
 including 
3 Id. at 8702. (“To respond to viewers’ desire to view video programming in more 
places at more times, broadcast station owners [and other content distributors] have 
developed online and mobile media platforms, using their websites as extensions of their 
local brands . . . .”) 
4 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–90 (1969) (“Although 
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in 
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards 
applied to them.” (citation omitted)). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (FCC can use its 
ancillary jurisdiction provided by Title I of the Communications Act to regulate a new 
technology that has the potential to harm broadcasting, a regulated medium); see also 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 691–95 (1979); United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649, 650–73 (1972); Kevin 
Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572 (2010) (“The FCC needed a hook 
to assert jurisdiction over cable.  To reach that goal, it used a two-step process.  First, the 
Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory grant of authority under 
section 152(a) of the [Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate ‘all 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.’  Second, the FCC invoked 
section 303(r) of the Act, which allows the Commission to issue ‘such rules and 
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,’ as 
‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’  The FCC also referenced section 
154(i), which provides that ‘[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such 
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the requirement that they deliver local broadcast signals but limit 
the number of “imported stations” outside the local market.  The 
FCC constrained cable operators’ programming freedom based on 
the assumption that without program carriage limitations, cable 
television viewing would fragment audiences and reduce 
broadcasters’ ability to continue providing advertiser-supported 
service requiring no additional upfront payment from consumers.6
The FCC can lawfully constrain and subordinate the First 
Amendment speaker rights of broadcasters and cable television 
operators based on court-approved balancing of the public and 
government interests on one hand, and that of media and conduit 
providers on the other hand.
 
7
                                                                                                             
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications 
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.’” (citations omitted)). 
  Generally, appellate courts have 
6 See, e.g.,Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994) (affirming FCC 
rules requiring cable operators to carry significantly viewed broadcast station signals) 
(“By preventing cable operators from refusing carriage to broadcast television stations, 
the must-carry rules ensure that broadcast television stations will retain a large enough 
potential audience to earn necessary advertising revenue—or, in the case of 
noncommercial broadcasters, sufficient viewer contributions—to maintain their 
continued operation. In so doing, the provisions are designed to guarantee the survival of 
a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s communication system, and to 
ensure that every individual with a television set can obtain access to free television 
programming.” (citations omitted)). 
7 Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, WIS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) 
(“Courts routinely reject constitutional objections to government laws providing access to 
additional spaces beyond traditional public forums—both to physical and virtual spaces, 
on both public and private property. These spaces include shopping malls, phone 
networks, cable networks, and wireless networks, among others. Despite the standard 
model’s guiding principle that government not interfere with speakers’ decisions and 
respect their negative liberty, judicial doctrines have consistently permitted government 
interference to ensure affirmative access even to many spaces owned by private parties. 
The standard model must recognize doctrinal “exceptions” for regulating access—to 
phone systems, to broadcast systems, to cable systems, and to shopping malls—and 
different, sui generis exceptions applicable to each space.”). See generally, Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What “The Freedom 
of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1686–91 (2011) (examining whether and 
how conduits of speech trigger First Amendment implications when analyzing 
government activity); Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First 
Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of 
Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185 (2007) (examining 
networks’ colliding First Amendment interests and judicial avoidance of a resolution of 
such issues); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 
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deferred to the FCC’s expert judgment that constraints on speech 
are reasonable and not targeted at specific types of content.8  A 
substantial body of law now supports mutually exclusive and 
media-specific models that qualify the First Amendment speaker 
rights of broadcasters,9 and even cable television operators whose 
closed-circuit networks do not use spectrum.10  Additionally the 
jurisprudence applicable to telephone companies assumes that such 
ventures operate solely as neutral conduits for delivering the 
content of others.11  This common carrier model12
                                                                                                             
N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989) (evaluating broadcasters’ freedom of speech and press and 
critique of judicial decisions that restrict broadcasters’ First Amendment rights). 
 draws a parallel 
between the neutral conduit function of telephone companies with 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (affirming FCC 
regulation of what broadcast television signals a cable television operator can import); 
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC rules 
requiring most cable television operators to provide local programming origination and 
distribution opportunities). 
9 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (affirming FCC requirement that 
broadcast stations provide free air time for coverage of campaigns including presidential 
debates); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (affirming FCC 
regulation and limits on combined ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers in the 
same local market); Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 375 (affirming compulsory right of 
reply to personal attack); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) 
(affirming FCC regulation of the commercial relationship between broadcast networks 
and local station affiliates). 
10 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (affirming FCC 
mandated carriage of significantly viewed broadcast television stations by cable 
television ventures based on an intermediate scrutiny assessment of regulations deemed 
not directly impacting broadcasters’ speaker rights); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. 
Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the essential element of common 
carriage is the carrier’s undertaking to carry for all people indifferently). 
11 Computer and Comm. Indus. Assoc. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(common carriers provide a service whereby customers may transmit intelligence of their 
own design and choosing). 
12 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2006) (Telecommunications carriers have “[t]he duty to 
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a 
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an 
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this title. An 
incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a 
manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such 
telecommunications service.”). 
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other traditional public utilities providing electric, water, gas, 
sewage and other essential services. 
Technological and marketplace convergences13 in the 
communications industry have rendered, or soon will render, 
obsolete assumptions about how specific media operate and the 
rationales for applying discrete and mutually exclusive regulatory 
models.  Content creators and packagers will no longer rely on 
channel-based distribution technologies to deliver content.14
Today, the major [multichannel video programming 
distributors (“MVPDs”)] offer hundreds of linear 
television channels, which are streams of 
programming that offer video programs on a 
specific channel at a specific time of day.  Many 
MVPDs also offer thousands of non-linear video-
on-demand (“VOD”) programs, including pay-per-
view (“PPV”) programs, which allow consumers to 
select and watch video programs whenever they 
request them. 
  
Instead consumers increasingly expect to have access at their 
convenience and on more flexible terms and conditions: 
15
The terms Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”)
 
16
                                                                                                             
13 Technological convergence refers to innovations that make it possible for a single 
medium to deliver several different types of content previously handled by separate 
networks.  For example, the Internet’s transmission of digital bitstreams makes it possible 
to handle voice, data, text and video content via a single network.  Marketplace 
convergence refers to the ability of a single venture to offer a bundle of services 
previously offered by other companies. 
 and Over-
the-Top Television 
14 See Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 9488, 9489 
(2012) (memorandum opinion and order), aff’d Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable 
Commc’ns, 59 Communications Reg. (P&F) 118 (F.C.C. Sept. 26, 2013) (memorandum 
opinion and order) (affirming Media Bureau interpretation of merger conditions requiring 
Comcast to position together in a sequence of channels all outlets of similar content, for 
example, news, when the company previously had opted to create such a “neighborhood” 
of some channels). 
15 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8617 (2012). 
16 IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files 
or view video content on an immediate “real time” basis. In re Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 
F.C.C.R. 3879, 3879 (2010) (emergency petition for temporary standstill).  Some of the 
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(“OTT”)17 refer to the ability of content creators and new or 
existing content distributors to provide consumers with access via 
broadband links in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional media.  
Currently content creators and distributors are experimenting with 
new options, having perhaps reluctantly acknowledged that the 
status quo cannot persist in light of proliferating consumer self-
help opportunities, many of which violate copyright laws and make 
it possible for consumers to access premium content for free.18
The Internet offers many legitimate, questionable and 
absolutely illegal opportunities to access both amateur and 
professional video content via the transmission of files for 
subsequent replay, through real time streaming of files and even 
the transmission of “live” programming, including pay-television 
sporting events.  Consumers with access to high-speed broadband 
networks can launch applications and visit websites providing 
convenient techniques for acquiring movies and other premium 
content.
 
19
Creators of content distributed via the Internet rightly expect to 
qualify for First Amendment protection, because the medium of 
distribution used should not impact their right to offer content in a 
 
                                                                                                             
available content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering 
disputes over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and 
prevent an IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. Id. at 3879–80 
(“Sky Angel has been providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for 
approximately two and a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, 
Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that 
these channels are a significant part of its service offering.”).  For background on IPTV, 
see In-Sung Yoo, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the 
Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain From Cable Service Regulation 
and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199, 202–205 (2009). 
17 See In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C.R. 
17905, n.48 (2010) (report and order) (“Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require 
the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers 
of over-the-top . . . [services] can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their 
own facilities.”). 
18 See The TWC TV App Will Allow You to Watch On Demand and Live Programming 
Outside Your Home, TW CABLE UNTANGLED, http://www.twcableuntangled.com/
2013/04/the-twc-tv-app-will-allow-you-to-watch-on-demand-and-live-programming-
outside-your-home/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
19 See, e.g., NETFLIX, http://www.neflix.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
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robustly competitive marketplace of ideas.  However, distributors 
of such content using an Internet conduit do not have the same 
certainty of First Amendment protection or insulation from FCC 
regulatory oversight.  On one hand, IPTV operators can make a 
persuasive argument that they operate as functional equivalents to 
cable television operators and other packagers of content.  
Similarly, the FCC has determined that any provider of Internet 
access provides an information service thereby qualifying for a 
largely unregulated status.20
On the other hand, the FCC has come to realize that some 
providers of broadband Internet access have both the ability and 
incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct that could thwart an 
open and robustly competitive marketplace for new Internet-
mediated competitive alternatives to existing services.  The FCC 
secured a voluntary forfeiture of $15,000 and an agreement by a 
small, rural telephone company not to block its broadband 
subscribers from accessing competitive Voice over the Internet 
Protocol (“VoIP”)
  If the FCC has largely deregulated all 
broadband conduit providers, then it would stand to reason that 
creators and packagers of content riding on top of a broadband link 
similarly operate as information service providers. 
21 telephone service. 22
                                                                                                             
20 See Time Warner Telecom., Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); In re 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless 
Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5909–14 (2007) (declaratory ruling); In re United Power 
Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of 
Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, 21 
F.C.C.R. 13281, 13285–90 (2006) (memorandum opinion and order); In re Appropriate 
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 
14853, 14863 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (reclassifying 
as an information service telephone company provided Internet access via Digital 
Subscriber Lines); In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over 
Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4821 (2002) (Cable Declaratory Ruling), 
aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 
(2005) (affirming FCC determination that cable modem Internet access constitutes a 
largely unregulated information service). 
  Determining that 
21 VoIP is the real-time carriage and delivery of data packets that correspond to voice. 
VoIP services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both computers and 
ordinary telephone handsets.  For technical background on how VoIP works, see Susan 
Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the 
Evolution to VoIP, FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.fcc.gov/events/tutorial-technical-
challenges-associated-evolution-voip. 
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Comcast, a major media venture, might seek to favor its own video 
content, or that of affiliates, the FCC sanctioned the company 
when it deliberately prevented certain broadband subscribers from 
downloading and sharing video files.23  On appeal Comcast 
convinced a reviewing court that the FCC lacked direct statutory 
authority to regulate Comcast’s information services.24  Despite 
the potential for consumer harm, the court held that the FCC could 
not lawfully stretch its indirect authority to fashion a remedy.25
A contentious debate has run for many years on the need for 
government oversight of Internet access and the imposition of 
nondiscrimination, network neutrality
 
26 obligations on Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”).27
                                                                                                             
22 In re Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005). See 
generally Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: 
The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal 
Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 332–37 (2008) (characterization of 
VoIP). 
  Such concerns for consumer 
23 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. 
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008) 
(memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
24 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC lacked 
direct statutory authority to sanction an ISP for discriminatory practices). 
25 Id. at 644 (“The Commission has failed to make that showing. It relies principally on 
several Congressional statements of policy, but under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit 
case law, statements of policy, by themselves, do not create ‘statutorily mandated 
responsibilities.’”); see also Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“The Commission may exercise this ‘ancillary’ authority only if it demonstrates 
that its action-here barring Comcast from interfering with its customers’ use of peer-to-
peer networking applications-is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of 
its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”). 
26 Network neutrality refers to government mandated nondiscrimination, transparency 
and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field among 
content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have 
unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns, such as ISP network management 
and national security. See Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 
INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUR. ECON. POL’Y, 4, 5 (2008). 
27 See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based 
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Bill D. Herman, 
Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 
103 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); 
Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, 3 ISJLP 185 (2007); Sascha D. 
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protection and a level competitive playing field have a direct 
impact on the scope and nature of First Amendment protection 
available not only for ISPs, but possibly also for ventures using an 
ISP conduit to deliver video content.  ISPs may overstate the scope 
of their content creation, management and packaging function, 
particularly in light of their primary function as neutral conduits 
and their incentive to operate mostly as a neutral party.  By 
claiming only to operate as neutral conduits, ISPs secure a near 
complete exemption from liability for the criminal and tortious 
conduct of subscribers, for example, the delivery of defamatory 
statements,28 as well as their copyright infringement, for example, 
the delivery of pirated video content.29
This Article will examine the ongoing migration from channels 
to software-configured platforms for accessing video content with 
  Nevertheless the nature 
and scope of First Amendment protection and insulation from 
regulatory oversight remains uncertain. 
                                                                                                             
Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open 
Internet, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 1; Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet 
Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153 (2008); Amit M. Schejter, “Justice, and Only Justice, 
You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory 
of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); Tim Wu, Network 
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2003). 
28 See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2010) (“No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”).  Courts have construed 
the immunity provisions in section 230 broadly in all cases arising from the publication 
of user-generated content. See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (finding statutory immunity from tort claims within provisions of § 230); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding 
after examination of prior judicial decisions that statutory immunity was granted from 
torts under § 230); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–31, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(determining that § 230 confers immunity on providers and users of interactive computer 
services); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–86 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (finding defendant immune to suit under § 230 for merely relaying information 
of a third party); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–32 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(distributor liability foreclosed under § 230). 
29 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (2010) exempts ISPs 
from liability for the infringement of a subscriber if the ISPs, upon notice, take down the 
content in a timely manner; see, e.g., IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (supporting safe harbor provision for service providers 
under § 512(c)). 
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an eye toward identifying near-term and longer-term impact on the 
commercial video marketplace and the First Amendment-
supported marketplace of ideas.  This Article identifies the need 
for significant amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to 
provide a light-handed and limited, but explicit statutory basis for 
the FCC to resolve predictable disputes between stakeholders and 
to remedy anticompetitive practices.  Because the currently 
fractious and politicized Congress is not likely to act, this Article 
provides suggestions on what the FCC can lawfully do now to 
provide greater regulatory clarity and specific, limited safeguards. 
I. BROADBAND TELEVISION 
OTT refers to the use of broadband transmission networks to 
deliver video bitstreams “on top of” other services such as Internet 
access and email.30
                                                                                                             
30 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and 
Services, 19 FCC Rcd. 15676, 15713 n.181 (2004) (“In the Open System Interconnection 
(‘OSI’) model, layered network architecture for packet networks typically consists of seven 
layers: physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation and application.  The 
model calls for the independent operation of the layers, and supports the interaction of 
various applications and equipment that is designed to address separately each layer in a 
product offering.  In the Transport Control Protocol (‘TCP’)-IP model, only four levels are 
used; link (combines OSI physical and data link levels), network, transport and application 
(combines OSI session, presentation and application levels).  The functions supported at 
each layer are as follows: physical–represents electrical signaling, modulation, etc.; data 
link–moves packets (also called ‘datagrams’) between hosts based on a protocol such as 
Ethernet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode, frame relay; network–defines how data is routed 
between hosts over one or several networks, often based on IP; transport–establishes the 
connection between two hosts, creating a ‘virtual’ network, often based on TCP or 
Universal Datagram Protocol; session–controls the setup and termination of 
communications sessions; presentation–defines the format of the data exchanged (e.g., text, 
graphic); application–defines how applications communicate with each other over the 
network (e.g., e-mail) using various protocols.”). See generally Joshua L. Mindel & 
Douglas C. Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to Improve a Layered Policy 
Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. POL’Y 136, 137 (2006); David 
P. Reed, Critiquing the Layered Regulatory Model, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
281 (2006) (detailing and critiquing the layered model, highlighting potential inherent 
economic consequences); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the 
Layered Model(s), 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006) (describing the layered 
model and its subsequent misinterpretation while emphasizing its continued utility); 
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle; Internet Architecture and the 
  Consumers must subscribe to fast, high 
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capacity broadband services, because video service requires 
networks that can transmit content on an instantaneous “real time” 
basis.  Even low quality video files, which are highly compressed 
and have comparatively lower resolution, require broadband 
networks that can deliver traffic at about one megabit per second 
or higher.31
OTT can enhance the value proposition offered by ISPs as 
subscribers increase their video content downloading and 
uploading activity thanks to the synergistic and serendipitous 
opportunities available from broadband networking.  Internet 
protocols support the loading, switching and routing of different 
kinds of traffic through the networks that interconnect to form the 
Internet cloud.
 
32  This means that Internet routers can handle video 
traffic in much the same way as they manage other less intensive 
bandwidth applications.  So long as the networks providing 
bitstream transmission can handle higher capacity streams and 
files, they can provide a medium for the delivery of video.  The 
term IPTV refers to the ability of the Internet, and specifically its 
Internet Protocol addressing scheme and its Transmission Control 
Protocol bitstream management formats, to provide broadband 
users with user-friendly ways to access video content.33
                                                                                                             
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004) (describing and supporting internet regulation via 
a layered model); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward; Formulating a New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 587 (2004) (detailing the current regulatory framework and advocating an 
approach that regulates along horizontal network layers). 
 
31 See Broadband Speed Guide, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/broadband-speed-guide (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
32 The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up 
the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the 
content available via these networks. See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: 
Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 
1199 (2010) (“The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the 
personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the 
ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s computers over the 
Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer.”). 
33 See Konrad L. Trope, Voice Over Internet Protocol: The Revolution in America’s 
Telecommunications Infrastructure, 22 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 1, 3 (2005) (“The 
Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that 
communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more 
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Many broadband subscribers of both wired and wireless 
services have discovered the benefit of using their subscriptions to 
access video.  In doing so, these subscribers may substantially 
increase the total volume of content they download.  Broadband 
carriers, particularly wireless operators, have become concerned 
that such downloading will trigger network congestion and exhaust 
existing capacity, requiring an ever growing investment in 
broadband plant.34  By offering subscribers unmetered, “all you 
can eat” (“AYCE”) service, broadband carriers have encouraged 
experimentation and access without regard to the operational and 
cost burdens incurred by ISPs.  Now many broadband carriers have 
abandoned AYCE pricing and offer metered service at different 
monthly rates based on the amount of permissible content 
downloading.35
                                                                                                             
than 100 million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the 
development of TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following 
characteristics or parameters: 1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own 
specific environment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to 
connect to other parts of the Internet. Communications are not directed in a unilateral 
fashion. Rather, communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis 
in which some packets of information may go through one series of computer networks 
and other packets of information go through a different permutation or combination of 
computer networks, with all of these information packets eventually arriving at their 
intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect the various 
networks; these boxes are called “gateways” and “routers.” The gateways and routers do 
not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being 
transmitted. 3. There is no global control of the Internet.”). 
  In lieu of tiered service, many ISPs invoke traffic 
34 See Stacey Higginbotham, Spectrum Shortage Will Strike in 2013, GIGAOM (Feb. 
17, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2010/02/17/analyst-spectrum-shortage-will-
strike-in-2013 (“The demand for mobile broadband will surpass the spectrum available to 
meet it in mid-2013, according to Peter Rysavy, a wireless analyst. In a report on the 
looming spectrum crisis that was sponsored by Research in Motion for the Mobile World 
Congress in Barcelona, Rysavy explains how the demand for bandwidth-consuming 
services used by more and more people will lead to a crappy user experience, or heavy-
handed pricing . . . and limitations on mobile application from carriers absent new 
spectrum allocations.”). 
35 See Brian Stelter, Sweeping Effects as Broadband Moves to Meters, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/media/internet-providers-
testing-metered-plans-for-broadband.html (“The broadband era began with the 
expectation that Internet connections were like buffets—all you can eat, 24 hours a day. 
But users are now being prodded to think about how much they’re consuming . . . . 
Usage-based billing is seen by some as a fairer alternative to broadband caps, a term most 
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management necessity as justification for deliberately slowing 
down (“throttling”) the delivery of traffic to subscribers exceeding 
a quota of permissible downloading volume.36
Prior to the elimination of AYCE service, ISPs branded the 
highest volume subscribers “bandwidth hogs” in light of their 
potential to cause network congestion.  ISPs consider these heavy 
users of broadband networks as a problem instead of an 
opportunity.  While heavy demand for data service contributes to 
short term congestion and the need to increase transmission 
capacity, subscribers’ expanded demand for broadband provides 
ISPs with the enviable long term opportunity to serve a growing 
market rather than one that has become static or declining. 
 
OTT distribution includes two primary ways to deliver content: 
(1) the immediate, “real time” streaming of programs 
simultaneously available via other traditional media, such as 
satellite, cable and broadcast television; and (2) the streaming or 
downloading of files containing video content, some of which was 
initially available only from incumbent media outlets.  Different 
commercial models have evolved to simulcast live content, 
download content and stream content without allowing consumers 
to store the file.  Incumbents recognize the need to offer more 
convenient access, but they do not want to make it possible for 
nonsubscribers to access the content, or for subscribers to record 
and redistribute it.37
                                                                                                             
closely associated with Comcast, which had been enforcing a limit of 250 gigabytes per 
Internet customer per month.”). 
 
36 See Tim Greene, Verizon Wireless Puts Bandwidth Hogs On A Data Diet, NETWORK 
WORLD (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/020311-verizon-
wireless-bandwidth-hogs.html (“Verizon will throttle back bandwidth available to the 
biggest data hogs on its wireless network in what it calls an effort to keep up service 
quality for everybody else.”).  
37 See Brian Stelter, Campaign Trains Viewers for ‘TV Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 
11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/business/media/campaign-trains-viewers-
for-tv-everywhere.html?_r=2&smid=tw-NYTimesAd&seid=auto.  For example, some 
major cable television operators have begun to offer subscribers the opportunity to access 
premium content via computers, tablets and smartphones away from the home television 
set. Id.  This “television everywhere” concept seeks to maintain the cable television 
subscription as prerequisite for access via other video content platforms. Id.  (“[Putting] 
in place TV Everywhere, a long-promised system for online television, calls for new 
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II. REGULATORY STATUS AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEAKER 
RIGHTS OF IPTV SERVICE PROVIDERS 
When IPTV service providers limit their activity to creating 
content, they qualify as uncontested First Amendment-protected 
speakers.38
First Amendment jurisprudence clearly supports the extension 
of some, although not all, First Amendment protection to ventures 
that do not create content, but instead package and distribute it.  
For example, operators of book stores qualify for First Amendment 
protection against government censorship and confiscation of 
content, even though the owner did not write the books and may 
not even know the nature of the content contained in any specific 
publication on the shelf.
  The controversy over First Amendment protection 
occurs when a video content provider also manages the delivery 
process using owned or acquired broadband capacity.  When 
content and conduit combine, questions arise as to whether and 
how First Amendment protections apply to the blended service, or 
if it remains limited to the content. 
39
                                                                                                             
contracts between channels and distributors and for new technology to check that viewers 
have paid their cable bills. And it takes something else: training. Viewers, after all, are 
not accustomed to being able to go online and see a library’s worth of television on 
demand.”). 
  Similarly, cable and satellite television 
38 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court 
held that restrictions on Internet-mediated content should trigger strict scrutiny because 
of the potential for harm to First Amendment protected speech: 
We are persuaded that the CDA [a law imposing sanctions for 
making content available via the Internet that can harm children] 
lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute 
regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to 
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large 
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and 
to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is 
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as 
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was 
enacted to serve.  
Id. at 874. 
39 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–55 (1959) (declaring unconstitutional a 
city ordinance making it illegal for bookstore operators to have obscene books, even 
unknowingly); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) (citing Lovell 
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)) (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of the press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication . . . .”). 
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operators acquire First Amendment protections in their capacity as 
packagers and distributors of content created by affiliates and even 
unaffiliated ventures.40
However First Amendment rights can be qualified and 
conditioned as applied to ventures that do not create content, but 
instead operate in one of the distribution channels that eventually 
reach consumers.  Courts have affirmed the FCC’s lawful authority 
to impose restrictions and limitations on cable
 
41 and satellite 
operators’42 speech.  Cable operators must offer to subscribers all 
significantly viewed local television stations whose management 
elects to forego copyright compensation in exchange for 
mandatory carriage.43  Additionally the FCC can impose caps on 
the national market penetration achieved by a single operator 44 
and establish well-reasoned safeguards against domination of the 
market for the creation of video content.45
                                                                                                             
40 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000) 
(invalidating a federal statute that required cable companies to either scramble or limit 
non-obscene pornography channels to certain hours).  In United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., the Court held that Congress needed to generate the least restrictive option 
among equally effective alternatives, such as having parent request scrambling or use 
filtering technology. Id. at 814–15.  Because content-based restrictions to protect minors 
from harmful materials must pass a rigorous “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review, 
the Court opted not to burden cable television operators with mandatory filtering duties. 
Id. at 825–27. 
  Satellite operators have 
to allocate a portion of their channel capacity for the carriage of 
41 See cases cited supra note 5. 
42 See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to affirm congressionally mandated channel set aside by 
Direct Broadcast Satellite for noncommercial educational and informational 
programming). 
43 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994). 
44 See Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1993), rev’d 
in part sub nom. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1316–20 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding cap on national market penetration passes intermediate 
scrutiny). But see, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding FCC 
failed to provide sufficient justification for a 30% national market penetration cap). 
45 See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming 
some FCC restrictions on market penetration and reversing others). 
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children’s programming46 and provide advertising capacity to 
candidates for elected office.47
Some IPTV ventures offer content only while others combine 
content and conduit in much the same manner as cable television 
operators.  Content-only IPTV ventures require users to secure a 
broadband pathway to the content using the broadband facilities of 
one or more ISPs.  The combination of content and conduit occurs 
seamlessly, but different companies participate.  For example, a 
subscriber to the Netflix movie streaming service secures two 
necessary subscriptions—one with Netflix for access to content 
and one with a retail ISP that provides access to and from the 
Internet cloud.
 
48  Upstream from the retail ISP, additional ventures 
provide the link to Netflix.49
Some ISPs have claimed First Amendment speaker status in 
FCC proceedings and in litigation.
  Some of these carriers operate as 
Content Distribution Networks (“CDNs”) that have agreed to 
provide downstream delivery of content from Netflix directly to 
the retail ISP that delivers the streaming content to a subscriber.  In 
some instances Netflix’s CDN interconnects with one or more ISPs 
before the traffic reaches the retail ISP making the final link to a 
viewer. 
50
                                                                                                             
46 See 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(f)(1) (2013) (“DBS providers shall reserve four percent of 
their channel capacity exclusively for use by qualified programmers for noncommercial 
programming of an educational or informational nature.”). 
  These claims provide a basis 
47 See 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(b) (mandating political broadcasting requirements). 
48 See How Does Netflix Work?, Watching Netflix, NETFLIX, https://support.netflix.
com/en/node/412. 
49 See Kevin Fitchard, Forget the CDN players, Netflix is caching its own video, 
GIGAOM (June 4, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/06/04/forget-the-cdn-players-
netflix-is-caching-its-own-video/; Todd Spangler, Netflix Uncouples ‘Super HD’ from 
Content-Delivery Network Program, VARIETY MAGAZINE, (Sep. 26, 2013, 2:58 PM). 
http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/netflix-stops-trying-to-use-super-hd-to-push-
content-delivery-network-program-1200671376/. 
50 See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 
17981–83 (2010) (report and order); see also Paul Barbagallo, Verizon First Amendment 
Challenge Of Net Neutrality Tests Century of Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 24, 
2013), http://www.bna.com/verizon-first-amendment-n17179872014 (discussing 
implications pending Verizon case, indicating that “[i]f the court agrees with Verizon, the 
FCC rules would be repealed, and every company that provides a pipeline through which 
consumers gain access to the internet, including Verizon, would be free to block websites 
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for objecting to efforts by the FCC to impose network neutrality 
requirements in addition to invoking the Comcast case precedent.  
More broadly they support the premise that the FCC should impose 
no regulations whatsoever.  By subordinating the conduit function 
and emphasizing the speaker function, ISPs seek to maintain or 
broaden their unregulated status as either information service 
providers, First Amendment speakers, or both. 
This two-track strategy may prevail, despite significant 
deficiencies.  While an appellate court did reverse the FCC when it 
attempted to sanction Comcast,51 another panel in the very same 
court affirmed the Commission’s imposition of interconnection 
obligations on wireless carriers providing information services.  In 
Cellco Partnership v. FCC,52 the court accepted the FCC’s 
rationale that it could regulate aspects of how wireless carriers 
provide data service.53  The FCC ordered all cellular 
radiotelephone companies to interconnect their wireless data 
networking capabilities, so that users temporarily located outside 
their home service territory could continue to access Internet 
services.54  Previously, the FCC had ordered these companies to 
provide voice telephone service to such “roaming” users so that 
these visitors would continue to make and receive calls.55
                                                                                                             
or treat their own web content better than that of rivals.”). See generally Benjamin, supra 
note 
  The 
FCC could mandate voice roaming interconnection because Title II 
of the Communications Act directly applies to these carriers 
operating as common carriers and offering Title II regulated 
7 (rejecting the premise that ISP conduit function warrants First Amendment 
protection); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an 
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010) (arguing that ISP’s 
editorial discretion fosters rather than impedes free speech values). 
51 See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R 13028, 13028 
(2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
52 700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
53 Id. at 537. 
54 Id. at 539. 
55 See In re Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for 
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 482 (1981) (report and order). 
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telecommunications services.56  The duty to interconnect with 
other carriers constitutes one of the basic nondiscrimination and 
accessibility requirements contained in Title II of the 
Communications Act.57
On the other hand cellphone company provision of wireless 
broadband data services does not trigger Title II FCC regulatory 
authority because the Commission determined that such an 
undertaking constitutes an information service.
 
58
The court deferred to the FCC’s expertise and ability to 
differentiate between common carrier responsibilities and what one 
could call quasi-common carrier responsibilities that impose a duty 
to deal: “[C]ommon carriage is not all or nothing—there is a gray 
area in which although a given regulation might be applied to 
common carriers, the obligations imposed are not common 
carriage per se.”
  Notwithstanding 
the FCC’s clear inability to impose Title II common carrier 
responsibilities, the court accepted the FCC’s assertion that 
compulsory roaming service was reasonable and did not constitute 
the unlawful imposition of a common carrier responsibility when it 
applies to wireless data service. 
59  The court noted that the FCC had not required 
the wireless carriers to offer roaming access on a uniform basis.  
Instead the FCC required only that the carriers negotiate 
“commercially reasonable” agreements that could take into 
consideration specific circumstances presented by each roaming 
access request, including the possibility of not having to provide 
service if technically infeasible.60
                                                                                                             
56 See Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 538.  The Communications Act of 1934 defines a 
common carrier as “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or 
foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of 
energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter.” 
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (2006)). 
 
57 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006). 
58 Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 538. 
59 Id. at 547. 
60 Id. at 537 (“[A]lthough the rule bears some marks of common carriage, we defer to 
the Commission’s determination that the rule imposes no common carrier obligations on 
mobile-internet providers.”). 
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals appears comfortable with 
the application of different Titles of the Communications Act to a 
single carrier when it provides different services resulting in “a 
bifurcated regulatory scheme.”61  The FCC has evidenced less 
comfort in subjecting a single venture to varying degrees of 
regulatory oversight.62
III. EVOLVING TRENDS IN VIDEO DISTRIBUTION 
  The Commission may have concluded that 
any and all retail broadband service qualifies as an information 
service based on its disinclination to make a nuanced decision 
whether and how to impose narrow requirements such as data 
roaming.  Now having made such a decision and having received 
judicial approval, the FCC might have a renewed inclination to 
expand selectively its regulatory wingspan. 
Consumers now have added flexibility and choices made 
possible by the evolution of three content display devices.  In 
addition to the conventional television set, which delivers one of 
many channels in sequence, computer monitors, wireless 
smartphones, and tablets offer a second, third, and fourth screen.  
These devices can display Internet-based content along with 
additional or duplicative content packaged by the carriers 
providing broadband access.  Consumers appear willing to tolerate 
significant difference in the visual and audio quality of service 
when viewed on different sized screens.  They also appear 
“technology agnostic” regarding which medium delivers the 
content. 
Consumers have become less tolerant of attempts by content 
distributors, in particular, to restrict access from alternative, non-
incumbent platforms.  Many appear to have few qualms about 
accessing content that may violate copyright laws.  A significant 
percentage of early adopters of new video access platforms may 
pursue illegal self-help options should content creators and 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. at 538. 
62 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522 
(1998) (report to Congress). 
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distributors opt to reduce opportunities to access highly desirable, 
“must see” television. 63
In conjunction with expanded display options, three models for 
video access have evolved:  
 
(1)Illegal, copyright infringing access to content via efficient 
peer-to-peer file transfer, or other direct links, as well as real time 
streaming of video content files and live television;  
(2) New, lawful access to live television or video files via new 
intermediaries such as Amazon, Apple, Hulu, Netflix, Roku and 
YouTube;64
(3) Efforts by incumbent broadcasters, broadcast networks, 
Direct Broadcast Satellite operators and cable television systems to 
offer new “television everywhere” options that provide additional 
access options to conventional appointment television and 
programmed recording of content.  
 and  
In the transition to platform-delivered content access 
incumbents and market entrants will compete for audiences.  
Market entrants will provide new, more flexible options that in 
turn will force incumbents to provide greater value and access 
options lest they lose market share. Heretofore content creators 
have explored new distribution options without abandoning 
traditional channels.  Currently successful content creators 
appreciate that the status quo has generated substantial returns, 
largely because the models lock in and guarantee predictable, 
recurring payments from consumers.  For example, the cable and 
                                                                                                             
63 See Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) about Piracy or Copyright 
Infringement, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/piracy/faq.cgi (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2013) (“Digital technology allows perfect copies and easy distribution of some 
works. That makes it easier for people to make and get copies of songs or videogames, 
and more difficult for copyright holders (record companies, etc.) to control the works 
once they are released to the public. This new technology has changed the way content 
distributors relate with their customers, and law and business models are just trying to 
catch up.”). 
64 AMAZON INSTANT VIDEO, http://www.amazon.com/Instant-Video/b?ie=UTF8&node
=2858778011 (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); HULU, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Nov. 
9, 2013); NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); ROKU, 
http://www.roku.com/?gclid=CL6P-eKQ2LoCFeHm7AodQhkAfg (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
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satellite television model requires monthly subscription payments 
from subscribers who receive many channels, not all of which any 
single subscriber would want.  By aggregating channels and 
prohibiting subscribers from choosing which individual channels 
they want on an individual, “à la carte” basis,65 cable television 
operators can accrue higher revenues for more costly service tiers 
that package both desirable and unwanted channels.  Sources of 
content appreciate that the aggregate revenues from an entire 
population of video subscribers will exceed the higher payments 
from a smaller subset of that population who select a specific 
channel of content.  For example, ESPN likely accrues more 
revenue from a smaller per-subscriber payment applicable to every 
cable and satellite subscriber than from a higher per-subscriber 
payment applicable only to à la carte subscribers who specify the 
desire to receive ESPN.  Similarly, even lightly viewed networks 
can impose small monthly fees for all subscribers purchasing a tier 
of programming comprising dozens of channels.66
Incumbent content creators and distributors appreciate that new 
distribution platforms can offer additional revenue generating 
opportunities.  However, the potential exists for these options not 
to accrue added revenues in light of the need to enhance the value 
proposition of monthly content subscriptions by offering greater 
flexibility for accessing and replaying content.  In the worst case 
scenario, a significant number of viewers can find ways to access 
content—even premium, pay per view offerings—at little or no 
cost, because an unauthorized party has pirated the content.  With 
 
                                                                                                             
65 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8759 (2012) (footnotes 
omitted) (“According to Nielsen, Americans watched on average 32 hours and 47 
minutes a week of traditional television and two hours and 21 minutes a week of time-
shifted television, compared to 27 minutes a week of video on the Internet, and only 7 
minutes a week of video on a mobile phone. Screen Digest estimated that all of the à la 
carte sales of television shows from Apple, Amazon, and other OVD competitors would 
amount to only $407 million in 2010, compared to what PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
estimates would be the $143 billion spent on television advertising and subscriptions.”) 
66 For example, Viacom typically offers cable television operators a bundle of 
networks that combine preferred programming, such as MTV and Nickelodeon, with 
obscure and less desired content, such as MTV2 and VH1 Classic. See Viacom Brands, 
VIACOM, http://www.viacom.com/brands/pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
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lower cost or free access to desirable content, consumers may 
become more inclined to “cut the cord” and abandon subscriptions 
with existing intermediaries. 
Incumbent distributors such as DBS and cable television 
operators risk “disintermediation,” that is, elimination as 
middlemen in a chain of distribution if OTT and other access 
options offer a better value proposition for access to desired 
content.  Even if new distribution options impose pay-per-view 
charges, or monthly subscription rates, consumers might have 
available new, à la carte options that provide access to desired 
content with a much lower total out of pocket cost.  The loss of 
access to even many channels may not matter if consumers had 
little interest in much of the content included in a package of 
channels.  Accordingly incumbent video distribution operators may 
have to respond to new access options with efforts to enhance the 
value proposition of their monthly and sizeable subscription 
charges based on an unmetered AYCE model. 
Content creators may financially benefit from new distribution 
options and windows of availability, particularly if they achieve 
greater control over access and do not have to share as much 
revenue with distribution partners.  However, the greater risk of 
piracy and strained relationships with long standing distribution 
partners, such as DBS and cable television, also motivate content 
creators to experiment cautiously.67
IV. ILLEGAL, COPYRIGHT INFRINGING MODELS 
 
The earliest video content access opportunities resulted from an 
adaptation of existing peer-to-peer file sharing techniques such as 
BitTorrent that started as music sharing sites.  Because file sharing 
software and the Internet generally make no distinction between 
file types, users found it easy to add video files.  Similarly, Internet 
protocols support the “real time” delivery of video programming as 
                                                                                                             
67 See Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the 
Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001 (2007), available at 
http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/25-AN-EXPLORATION-OF-RIGHTS-
MANAGEMENT-TECHNOLOGIES-USED-IN-THE-MUSIC-INDUSTRY.pdf. 
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well as the downloading of video content files.68  A variety of 
websites currently offer lawful and legally suspect, “simulcast” 
access to live television, including premium channels.69
Absent a license to redistribute video content and the expected 
agreement to compensate the copyright holder, these sites violate 
the intellectual property of content creators and distributors.   
Ample case law supports the conclusion that web-based providers 
of access to content can be held secondarily liable for copyright 
infringement even though the software and Internet-routing used 
directly links the source of the content to the recipient.
 
70  
Intermediaries that knowingly facilitate or induce copyright 
infringement bear the legal responsibility for damages caused by 
others.71
                                                                                                             
68 See In re Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3879–80 (2010) (IPTV offers 
consumers with broadband connections options to download video files or view 
(streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. Some of the available 
content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering disputes 
over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an 
IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been 
providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a 
half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, 
Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a 
significant part of its service offering.”).  For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The 
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal 
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and 
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009). 
  This means that web-based sites that help promote 
infringement will be deemed legally responsible for the financial 
damages resulting from the distribution of file sharing software 
69 See, e.g.,NO SUBSCRIPTION REQUIRED, http://www.nosubscriptionrequired.net/ (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013); see also, WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d. Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction based the holding that Internet-based 
venture did not qualify as a cable television operator); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. AEREO, 
Inc., 874 F.Supp.2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (preliminary injunction denied thereby allowing 
a venture to deliver broadcast channels via the Internet), aff’d sub nom,WNET v. Aereo, 
Inc. Docket Nos.  712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. AEREO, 571 U.S. ___ (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-461). 
70 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) (holding a knowing distributor of copyrighted material liable for resulting third 
party acts of infringement). 
71 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 
(2009). 
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and from offering a web-based platform for access to sources of 
copyright infringing content. 
IPTV techniques and much of the currently available OTT 
content promote copyright infringement, largely because relatively 
few content providers and distributors have authorized access 
through nontraditional media.  Rather than considering alternative 
distribution as a possible source of supplemental income, 
incumbents initially concluded that these new options largely 
promoted piracy without any upside financial opportunities. 
V. NEW IPTV INTERMEDIARIES 
Incumbents subsequently reconsidered the conclusion that they 
should try to thwart IPTV by refusing to offer content access 
alternatives.  New and legal IPTV options, such as YouTube, 
gained traction and visibility thereby demonstrating that even 
amateur video could generate substantial audiences. Content 
sources have cautiously and incrementally explored directly 
distributing their content via their own branded sites or via new 
intermediaries such as Amazon, Apple, Hulu, Netflix, Roku and 
YouTube.72  Most broadcast networks and many cable/satellite 
networks now consider the web as offering an opportunity to reach 
more viewers, thereby generating higher market penetration and 
advertising revenues.  These content sources typically provide 
access after initial distribution via traditional media outlets so that 
consumers do not abandon or regularly substitute traditional 
distribution intermediaries.73
Content distribution intermediaries can provide an interface 
between video content consumers and sources.  By serving as an 
intermediary, these sites can enforce digital rights management
 
74
                                                                                                             
72 See relevant websites cited supra note 64. 
 
limitations on access, recording and redistribution as well as 
collect payments for premium content or superior access options.  
73 E.g., HBO GO, http://www.hbogo.com (last visited Nov.9, 2013). 
74 Digital Rights Management refers to the use of technological tools by copyright 
owners and distributors to regulate the uses of their works, and in particular to restrict or 
prohibit copying. 
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However, content creators can only go so far in their exploration 
because of existing and highly lucrative distribution contracts with 
incumbent media.  While it might appear enticing to eliminate 
“middlemen” intermediaries, the proliferation of new ones 
evidences resiliency and continuing viability of this model.  
Content sources will have to calibrate closely the blend of access 
options they offer directly, via incumbent outlets and via new 
intermediaries. 
VI. DIVERGING INCENTIVES AND INCREASED RISKS 
Before the onset of new and experimental content distribution 
models, content creators and distributors had established a 
mutually beneficial model.  This model consisted of setting up 
several sequential windows of access based on the time since 
initial release, and the willingness of consumers to pay for access.  
Movies followed a predictable track with initial access solely in 
theaters, followed by pay-per-view and other premium channel 
access, followed by release of a Digital Video Disk (DVD), after 
which the content becomes less a lure for direct payments from 
consumers and more an advertiser supported attraction with 
content typically available first on premium cable/DBS networks 
and subsequently on non-premium, basic tier networks, followed 
even later in time by broadcast television. 
Cable programming has been tiered into categories of content 
access with premium content, such as movies and high budget 
original programming, located on higher cost tiers, offered as a 
stand-alone premium channel, or even pay-per-view access.  New 
distribution models provide consumers with access to some 
premium content earlier in time on an à la carte, pay-per-view 
basis.  Additionally some content creators have opted to provide 
access to even premium content, via new access platforms operated 
by incumbent distributors, or upon proof that the consumer has 
already paid for a subscription, for example, to a cable television 
operator. 
Video program creators see new distribution platforms as 
possibly offering new revenue growth opportunities and greater 
market penetration.  However, content creators must operate with 
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caution so that they do not lose control over access to their product 
and also do not harm revenue stream flowing to traditional 
distribution partners.  If a content creator decides to serve 
consumers directly via new distribution platforms, incumbent 
distributors might attempt to retaliate by favoring other content 
sources. 
Content distributors want to maintain the highly profitable 
status quo, but the traditional locked-down, largely one-way 
distribution model based on their status as unavoidable 
intermediaries appears unsustainable in light of new options 
available to consumers.   Incumbents have reluctantly concluded 
that they must provide greater access flexibility to subscribers, 
including the opportunity to watch the same content multiple times 
without additional payment.  Incumbent video distributors so far 
do not seem to think it imperative to offer vastly more content in 
addition to greater flexibility in accessing existing content.   With 
the exception of a new cable television network managed by talk 
show host Oprah Winfrey,75 the industry has not introduced many 
new networks in the last few years.  Likewise, all of the top twenty 
networks, in terms of number of subscribers, entered the market 
years ago.76
As new access options provide both flexibility and more 
content, incumbents might recognize the need to increase options, 
despite having previously assumed that they need only serve as the 
gateway to designated must-see television.  Consumers are 
questioning in growing numbers a subscription model that 
regularly increases monthly rates well above measures of overall 
cost of living.  Cable and DBS operators may have grown 
complacent in that an AYCE model can remain dominant, because 
consumers heretofore lacked options that offered the combination 
of must see and niche content.  Now the Internet operates as a 
 
                                                                                                             
75 See OWN NETWORK, http://www.oprah.com/own (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
76 Compare Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, 15 FCC Rcd. 978 (2000) (sixth annual report detailing increase in 
market of networks and providers) with In re Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 
27 FCC Rcd. 8610 (2012) (detailing expansion of current networks into new mediums). 
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medium for access to much of the same must-see television along 
with often free access to niche content. 
VII. EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS 
Consumers stand to benefit from proliferating video content 
access opportunities, with two caveats.  First, the options cannot 
subvert existing and new payment models by offering free access 
to pirated content.  Second, incumbents should not be able to 
collude with an eye toward preventing consumers from enjoying 
lawful alternative access opportunities.  We can expect incumbent 
cable and satellite carriers to pressure content creators not to 
pursue options that eliminate them as intermediaries, whether 
through direct access, or through replacement intermediaries.  
Likewise, the possibility exists that incumbent intermediaries and 
content sources may seek to use new digital rights management 
techniques to reduce the opportunities subscribers have to copy 
and share content even in lawful ways.77
The concept of fair use refers to the ability of consumers, under 
specific and limited circumstances, to reproduce and share 
copyrighted content.
  The copyright laws of 
many nations provide opportunities for copying and sharing 
content on a limited basis without liability for infringement. 
78
                                                                                                             
77 See Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality 
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and 
Consumers, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 670–71 (2008). 
  The limits to fair use emphasize that social 
benefits accrue from limited copying without significant financial 
harm to the content creator.  Some of the technological innovations 
that make it possible to track consumers’ wants, needs and desires 
also provide ways to identify and block fair use opportunities.  One 
such technology called deep packet inspection (“DPI”) provides a 
way to identify the nature and type of content a specific subscriber 
78 See, e.g., Michael Pote, Mashed-Up In Between: The Delicate Balance Of Artists’ 
Interests Lost Amidst The War On Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 669–83 (2010) (fair 
use enables users to reproduce copyrighted musical content under a balancing of multiple 
factors to foster creativity); Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008) (describing fair use and arguing that it plays an 
important and underappreciated role in national technology and innovation policy). 
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is accessing.79  The power to track usage by subscribers can 
combine with the ability to block such access immediately.80  Fair 
use typically involves copying first and defending the copying later 
in court.  With DPI, content creators and distributors can block 
first and never have to pursue a judicial remedy.81
End users will suffer from new content access options if 
incumbents can freely condition access based on their 
interpretation of what constitutes fair use.  A limited view of this 
user right, backed up by technologies that can block access 
immediately, can further lock down content rather than provide 
more diverse and lawful ways to enjoy it. 
  This means that 
even instances of fair use cannot occur because a carrier or content 
creator has opted to use techniques that block suspicious activity, 
regardless of whether it turns out to be an instance of fair use 
instead of piracy. 
VIII. EFFECT ON EXISTING MEDIA-SPECIFIC LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY MODELS 
Technological and marketplace convergences make it possible 
for the Internet to become the single, preferred medium for the 
delivery of information, communications and entertainment 
(“ICE”) services to consumers.  Both incumbent and market 
entrants have the opportunity to accrue economies of scale and 
scope and to increase their size, revenue and profitability by using 
the Internet cloud as a medium for delivering content to television 
sets, computer monitors, tablets and smartphone screens.  
Technological and marketplace convergences have become a 
reality with the Internet increasingly becoming the single preferred 
medium for delivery of previously separate broadcast, cable, 
satellite and telecommunication services.  Subscribers of a wired or 
wireless ISP can use their broadband link to the Internet cloud for 
                                                                                                             
79 See Peter Whoriskey, Every Click You Make, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR2008040304052.html. 
80 See id. 
81 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair 
Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60–68 (2006). 
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access to a plethora of content previously available only via 
broadcast, cable or satellite media. 
Both the FCC82 and reviewing courts83 have evidenced a 
reluctance to deviate from applying medium-specific, single 
regulatory classifications even for services that display convergent 
characteristics.84  For example, the FCC has determined that all 
forms of broadband Internet access constitutes a substantially 
unregulated information service,85
                                                                                                             
82 The FCC appears to believe that it must apply only one regulatory classification to a 
service that may combine two or more functions. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on 
Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R 11501, 11522 (1998) (report to 
Congress) (“[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] 
indicate that the drafters . . . regarded telecommunications services and information 
services as mutually exclusive categories.”); see also Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (D. Minn. 2003) (applying the FCC’s dichotomy).  Perceiving the 
need to apply one classification the FCC appears to favor using the less restrictive one.  
For example, the Commission treats all types of broadband access as information 
services. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over 
Cable and Other Facilities,17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice 
of proposed rulemaking) (asserting that cable modem service is appropriately classified 
as an internet service and not a cable service), aff’d Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–86 (2005) (affirming the classification that 
does not subject cable modem service to Title II common-carrier regulation). 
 despite the fact that 
83 Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state law 
mandating right of reply to editorial deemed to violate newspaper publisher’s First 
Amendment speaker rights) with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(upholding FCC-mandated right of reply to broadcast personal attack in light of 
comparatively greater listeners’ First Amendment rights over that available to 
broadcasters). 
84 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently evidenced an 
appreciation that a single carrier can offer two or more services triggering different 
regulatory classifications.  In Cellco Partnership, the court affirmed the FCC’s 
requirement that wireless carriers must provide “data roaming” Internet access to 
temporary visitors. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  To achieve 
such access the FCC required all carriers to negotiate commercial interconnection 
agreements if technologically feasible, despite the fact that the FCC had classified 
Internet access as an information service not subject to Title II common carrier 
regulation. Id. at 535.  The court expressed appreciation that some services combine 
features and characteristics: “[C]ommon carriage is not all or nothing—there is a grey 
area in which although a given regulation might be applied to common carriers, the 
obligations imposed are not common carriage per se.”  Id. at 547. 
85 Information service is defined as:  
[T]he offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available 
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telecommunications networks provide the transmission needed to 
link subscribers in many geographical locations with content and 
services located elsewhere.86
ISPs qualify for largely unregulated status based mainly on the 
view that government has no legal basis for regulating the content 
traversing the various networks that make up the Internet.  
Additionally, Congress and the FCC assume ISPs operate in a 
robustly competitive marketplace, or alternatively that these 
 
                                                                                                             
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic 
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for 
the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications 
system or the management of a telecommunications service. 
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2010). 
86 The FCC treats information services and telecommunications services as mutually 
exclusive. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 
13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522 (1998) (“[T]he language and legislative history of [the 
Communications Act of 1996] indicate that the drafters . . .  regarded telecommunications 
services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.”); see also Vonage 
Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 994, 1000 (following the guidelines of the Stevens 
Report).  This self-imposed constraint has forced the FCC to apply a single regulatory 
classification to services that combine telecommunications and information services.  In 
solely applying the information services classification to broadband, the FCC opted to 
ignore or subordinate the telecommunications function. See Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14910–
11 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (“We conclude, 
consistent with Brand X, that such a transmission component [in a DSL service] is mere 
‘telecommunications’ and not a ‘telecommunications service.’ As stated above, the Act 
defines telecommunications service as ‘the offering of telecommunications for a fee 
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to 
the public, regardless of the facilities used.’ Thus, whether a telecommunications service 
is being provided turns on what the entity is ‘offering . . .  to the public,’ and customers’ 
understanding of that service. End users subscribing to wireline broadband Internet 
access service expect to receive (and pay for) a finished, functionally integrated service 
that provides access to the Internet. End users do not expect to receive (or pay for) two 
distinct services—both Internet access service and a distinct transmission service, for 
example. Thus, the transmission capability is part and parcel of, and integral to, the 
Internet access service capabilities. Accordingly, we conclude that wireline broadband 
Internet access service does not include the provision of a telecommunications service to 
the end user irrespective of how the service provider may decide to offer the transmission 
component to other service providers.”);  see also Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery 
and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and 
Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 
(2006). 
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ventures do not provide essential public utility service 
necessitating heavy-handed regulatory oversight to ensure fair and 
nondiscriminatory access to these services at reasonable prices.  
Under either scenario, the FCC must have assumed that it would 
not need to resolve interconnection disputes between Internet-
ventures, or to remedy anticompetitive practices of an ISP.  The 
FCC’s confidence in a self-regulating Internet has proven 
unjustified, because the Commission has received complaints 
about predatory and discriminatory practices for which it lacks a 
direct statutory basis to remedy.87
Courts have allowed the Commission to regulate VoIP 
telephone service alternatives,
  Having deemed the Internet as 
worthy of deregulation as an information service, the FCC cannot 
subsequently re-regulate it, absent judicial deference or new 
legislation. 
88 but not to sanction Comcast for 
what appeared to be an anticompetitive practice.89
                                                                                                             
87 See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 
(2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (the FCC determined that Comcast deliberately thwarted file sharing 
from and to subscribers with an eye toward creating disincentives for broadband 
subscribers to use alternatives to the company’s pay per view, video on demand services). 
  In the former, 
the FCC successfully invoked the need to maintain regulatory 
parity between legacy telephone service and VoIP, without even 
having to specify that VoIP constitutes a telecommunications 
88 See Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming 
FCC regulatory oversight of VoIP and preempting state deregulation or inconsistent 
regulation and FCC’s decision to require VoIP operators to contribute to universal service 
funds); Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring 
interconnected VoIP service providers to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); The 
Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to 
Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and Broadband Internet 
Service Providers, 27 FCC Rcd. 2650, 2655 (2012) (report and order) (requiring VoIP 
carriers to report service outages); Local Number Portability Porting Interval and 
Validation Requirements, 25 FCC Rcd. 6953, 6966–68 (2010) (report and order) 
(establishing fast deadlines for migrating a telephone service subscriber to and from VoIP 
service); Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927, 
6929 (2007) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending 
customer proprietary network information obligations to interconnected VoIP service 
providers). 
89 See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661. 
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service.90  In the latter, the FCC abandoned direct statutory 
authority to regulate Internet-based services by determining that all 
broadband services qualify for a “safe harbor” from regulation as 
information services.91
Convergence and the ascendency of the Internet make it certain 
that a single venture will offer both regulated telecommunications 
services and largely unregulated information services, possibly 
combined into a hybrid or composite.  For example, wireless 
carriers provide subscribers with the option of using their handsets 
for basic voice telephone service, a telecommunications service, 
but also to access the Internet, an information service.  Many 
subscribers quickly and frequently toggle between both services, 
yet the FCC has made no effort to respond to this reality.  The 
Commission continues to treat voice and data services as separate, 
despite the fact that the same carrier provides both. 
 
The FCC and courts should explicitly recognize that single 
ventures could provide an array of different services that trigger 
different regulatory classifications and First Amendment 
protection.  Failing to do so means that a venture can try to invoke 
a single classification that accrues the best regulatory and 
marketplace posture, with the option of changing that election at 
any time.  For example, an ISP can claim to operate as a First 
Amendment speaker, entitled to robust insulation from government 
intrusion, but then change its posture to neutral conduit if doing so 
qualifies it for even better entitlements, for example, safe harbor 
exemption from liability for subscribers’ copyright infringement, 
or other harmful activities including defamation.92
                                                                                                             
90 See Vonage Holding Corp., 489 F.3d at 1240–41. 
 
91 See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 
13034–36 (2008). 
92 See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service 
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1279 (2010). 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ideally Congress should amend the Communications Act of 
1934 to establish the conditions under which the FCC would have 
jurisdiction to resolve complaints and to remedy anticompetitive 
practices.  Convergent services using the Internet do not 
sufficiently track any of the existing broadcasting, 
telecommunications and video services.  Accordingly a new Title 
for Internet Services should specify that the FCC has statutory 
authority to intervene when commercial negotiations cannot 
resolve interconnection and other disputes among ventures and 
when competition proves unsustainable to prevent anticompetitive 
practices. 
This Title should reverse the FCC’s conclusion that any and all 
Internet services constitute information services by explicitly 
acknowledging that limited regulatory safeguards are necessary.  
Specifically, the Title should ensure that carriers providing the 
telecommunications link between end users and the sources of 
content and software are subject to FCC oversight to ensure that 
their commercially negotiated interconnection terms and 
conditions for service are transparent and nondiscriminatory.  This 
Title should not mandate common carriage, but put private carriers 
on notice that they cannot impose non-neutral rules and access 
conditions that have the effect of retarding competition and robust 
access. 
The new Internet Services Title should explicitly state that the 
limited regulatory safeguards created do not extend to ventures that 
acquire or lease transmission capacity on top of which they add 
services, applications and software.  This Title should provide no 
basis for regulating content, or the protocols and operating 
standards Internet ventures use to manage their networks.  
Likewise the Title should mandate network neutrality only to the 
extent needed to prevent ISPs from deliberately throttling, delaying 
or blocking traffic that causes no harm even as it might compete 
with services provided by the ISP or an affiliate.  The vast majority 
of instances where the FCC should intervene should result from a 
complaint about the terms and conditions under which two or more 
ISPs interconnect lines and facilities. 
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The FCC should have lawful statutory authority to remedy 
disputes among carriers and between carriers and subscribers when 
the parties cannot reach a timely settlement.93
 
  This authority 
covers both telecommunications services and information services.  
However, the Commission must act with restraint in light of 
limited statutory authority to act prospectively instead of 
responding to a complaint.  The possibility exists that many, if not 
most disputes can get resolved through commercial negotiations.  
On the other hand, intractable disputes may increase, particularly 
ones where stalling favors one side.  For these types of problems, 
the FCC should have lawful authority to investigate and remedy 
anticompetitive and discriminatory practices. 
                                                                                                             
93 Sometimes FCC inaction will result in temporary inconvenience to consumers, for 
example, when desirable television channels are eliminated in retransmission consent 
negotiations between broadcasters and cable television operators. See Meg Burton, 
Reforming Retransmission Consent, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 617, 618–19 (2012).  However 
premature regulatory intervention might cause greater harm. 
